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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Lubritene Ltd. ("Lubritene") and four of its directors and 
officers appeal the District Court's order compelling them to 
arbitrate claims brought against them by Bel-Ray 
Company, Inc. ("Bel-Ray"). Lubritene claims the District 
Court erroneously concluded that it was bound under its 
predecessor's arbitration agreement. The directors and 
officers contend that the District Court erred because it 
lacked personal jurisdiction over them, and because they 
are not bound by their corporate principal's agreement to 
arbitrate. We agree that Lubritene is bound to arbitrate this 
dispute and that the District Court had personal 
jurisdiction over the directors and officers. We conclude, 
however, that the directors and officers are not bound to 
arbitrate Bel-Ray's claims against them. Accordingly, we 
will affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 
I. 
 
Bel-Ray is a New Jersey corporation engaged in the 
business of manufacturing specialty lubricants for the 
international mining, industrial and consumer markets. 
Bel-Ray has developed special formulas and blending 
technology for its products and maintains them in the 
highest confidentiality. Between 1983 and 1996, Bel-Ray 
entered into a series of agreements with Chemrite (Pty.) 
Ltd., a South African corporation, for the blending and 
distribution of Bel-Ray products in South Africa. Ivor H. 
Kahn, Cesare Carbonare, Ian Robertson, and Pierre Van 
Der Riet (the "Individual Appellants") were officers or 
directors, as well as shareholders, of Chemrite. 
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In January of 1996, the parties entered into the most 
recent set of these agreements (the "Trade Agreements") by 
executing a (i) Distributor Sales Agreement, (ii) Blending 
Manufacturing License Agreement, and (iii) License 
Agreement to Trade Name. The Trade Agreements allowed 
Chemrite to market and sell Bel-Ray products, and to 
produce and market products under Bel-Ray's trade name 
in South Africa. Each agreement contains two clauses 
relevant to this appeal. First, each agreement required 
arbitration of "any and all disputes relating to th[e] 
agreement or its breach" in Wall Township, New Jersey. 
(A38; A60; A86) Arbitration was to proceed under the 
American Arbitration Association rules and New Jersey 
substantive law. Second, the agreements specifically require 
Bel-Ray's written consent to any assignment of Chemrite's 
interests under the Trade Agreements. 
 
On August 20, 1996, Chemrite sent Bel-Ray a fax 
indicating that it had changed its name to "Lubritene (Pty) 
Ltd." The change became more than nominal on October 
10, 1996, when Chemrite sold its lubricant business, 
expressly including its rights under the Trade Agreements 
to Lubritene, a newly formed business entity, and Chemrite 
entered liquidation. Lubritene continued Chemrite's 
lubricant business at the same location with the same 
employees and management, and the Individual Appellants 
became Lubritene shareholders, directors and officers. 
Lubritene and Bel-Ray continued to conduct business in 
the same manner under the Trade Agreements. In 
November of 1996, Lubritene sent Bel-Ray a package of 
documents that included the October 10th sale of assets 
documents and thereby informed Bel-Ray that Lubritene 
was a new and separate company. 
 
In the Spring of 1997, the parties engaged in a series of 
negotiations. These negotiations were initially motivated by 
Bel-Ray's interest in acquiring a stake in Lubritene. When 
it became clear that such an acquisition was not in the 
cards, the negotiations turned to focus upon modifying the 
Trade Agreements to add additional industrial products and 
to extend their terms to six years. During negotiating 
sessions in South Africa, Lubritene representatives queried 
Bel-Ray representative Linda Kiefer as to whether Bel-Ray 
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believed there was a legally binding agreement between 
Lubritene and Bel-Ray. According to Keifer: 
 
       [she] explained to them that, not being an attorney, 
       [she] could not comment on the legal enforceability of 
       the [Trade Agreements], but told them that Bel-Ray's 
       attorneys had advised [her] that technically and legally 
       we do have an agreement. Moreover, [she] pointed out 
       that both Bel-Ray and Lubritene had continued to 
       conduct business in the same manner without 
       interruption, since the agreements were signed . . . 
       [and] that [she] understood from Bel-Ray's attorneys 
       that as long as we both continued to do business 
       according to the terms of the existing agreements while 
       we discussed a possible new relationship, Bel-Ray had 
       an implied agreement with Lubritene on the same 
       terms as the existing agreements with Chemrite. 
 
(A285). Six Lubritene affiants, however, contend that Keifer 
stated that "technically and legally there is no agreement 
between Lubritene and Bel-Ray" because any assignment of 
the Chemrite agreement required Bel-Ray's written consent, 
which had not yet been granted. 
 
Soon after these negotiations, a former Lubritene director 
brought internal corporate documents to Bel-Ray's 
attention. Among these documents were the minutes of a 
Lubritene board meeting held in anticipation of the Spring 
1997 negotiations "to resolve the legal stance Lubritene 
(Pty) Ltd must take in respect of the Bel-Ray Company Inc[.] 
agreement." (A127) Lubritene's counsel advised the board at 
the meeting that: 
 
       while admittedly the [Trade Agreements were] 
       entered into between Chemrite Southern Africa (Pty) 
       Ltd[.,] and Bel-Ray Company Inc.[,] after the 
       deregistration/liquidation of Chemrite Southern Africa 
       (Pty) Ltd[.], Bel-Ray still continued to deal commercially 
       with Lubritene (Pty) Ltd and therefore, Bel-Ray's 
       conduct has basically assumed that the assigned 
       agreements were in fact assigned to Lubritene (Pty) 
       Ltd.[.] However, the agreements state that the transfer 
       of the agreements must be approved in writing by Bel- 
       Ray. 
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Id. The board then resolved to (i) liquidate Chemrite; (ii) 
"continue to trade with Bel-Ray Company Inc as is and not 
[to] suggest any changes to the current agreement when 
Linda Kiefer and Bernie Meeks visit South Africa in April"; 
(iii) create another new company and transfer all of 
Lubritene's business other than Bel-Ray to that company 
so that Lubritene "will have no assets" and"[i]f Bel-Ray 
decides to take legal action against Lubritene (Pty) Ltd, 
there will be nothing left in the company and hence Bel-Ray 
will not recover any damages"; and (iv) when Bel-Ray seeks 
to renew the Trade Agreements to inform them that the 
Trade Agreements were with Chemrite, "which does not 
exist anymore and that the agreements are no longer valid." 
Id. The minutes end by instructing that "[i]t is vital that we 
do not alert Bel-Ray to our plans and hence we must be 
very cautious and circumspect when we ALL meet with 
them in April." Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
Bel-Ray alleges that these minutes and the other 
documents brought to them by the former Lubritene 
director reveal that Lubritene, and the Individual 
Appellants as its officers and directors, conspired to 
misappropriate Bel-Ray's technology and other proprietary 
information and intentionally defrauded Bel-Ray by leading 
it to believe that Lubritene would abide by the Trade 
Agreements. Additionally, they allege that Lubritene 
marketed Bel-Ray products falsely under Lubritene's trade 
name, and conversely marketed inferior Lubritene products 
under Bel-Ray's trade name thereby damaging Bel-Ray's 
business reputation. 
 
Bel-Ray filed this action in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey to compel Lubritene 
and the Individual Appellants to arbitrate their claims 
under the Trade Agreements' arbitration clauses. Bel-Ray 
alleges that Lubritene's actions amount to the business 
torts of (i) unfair competition, (ii) fraud, and (iii) 
misappropriation. Bel-Ray also claims that these same 
actions constitute breaches of the Trade Agreements.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Additionally, Bel-Ray alleges that Lubritene owes it $64,532.60 for 
products received but not paid for. These products were purchased 
under bills of lading between Bel-Ray and Lubritene that included 
arbitration clauses for disputes regarding amounts owed. The parties do 
not discuss these claims in their briefs to this Court. Nonetheless, it 
would appear that compelling arbitration of these claims was proper. 
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Lubritene and the Individual Appellants, jointly 
represented, filed an answer asserting inter alia lack of 
personal jurisdiction and counterclaims. The counterclaims 
alleged that Bel-Ray had commenced related proceedings in 
South Africa to enjoin Lubritene from continuing to use its 
intellectual property and trade name, and requested the 
District Court to either (i) stay the proceedings, or (ii) enjoin 
Bel-Ray from seeking to compel arbitration because it had 
waived its right to arbitrate by initiating the South African 
litigation. Two months later, the Individual Appellants filed 
a motion on their counterclaims requesting a stay, or 
alternatively, summary judgment enjoining Bel-Ray from 
seeking to compel arbitration. 
 
The District Court denied the appellants' motion. Months 
later, the Court granted Bel-Ray summary judgment and 
entered an order compelling arbitration on August 10, 
1998. Lubritene and the Individual Appellants appeal this 
order. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C.S 203 
because this action to compel arbitration between 
international parties falls under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
See 9 U.S.C. SS 201-208. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review the District Court's summary 
judgment order compelling arbitration de novo and apply 
the same test that the District Court should have applied. 
Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating 
Eng'rs, AFL-CIO, 982 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1992). 
"[P]ursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), we ask: `(1) is there no 
genuine issue of material fact and (2) is one party entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law?' " Id. (quoting Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir.1992)). 
 
III. 
 
We begin with the propriety of the District Court's order 
to the extent it compelled Lubritene to arbitrate Bel-Ray's 
claims. Under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), a court 
may only compel a party to arbitrate where that party has 
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entered into a written agreement to arbitrate that covers 
the dispute. See 9 U.S.C. SS 2 & 206. The arbitration 
clauses in the Trade Agreements are the only written 
agreements to arbitrate offered in this case. It is 
undisputed that these agreements were entered into by 
Chemrite and Bel-Ray, and that Chemrite subsequently 
assigned the agreements to Lubritene. If these assignments 
are effective, then the District Court's order should be 
affirmed. Lubritene, however, contends that the 
assignments are ineffective because Bel-Ray did not 
consent to the assignments in writing as the Trade 
Agreements require. They therefore argue that there is no 
written agreement to arbitrate and we must reverse the 
District Court's order. 
 
Thus, according to Lubritene, this case turns on the 
effect to be given to the Trade Agreements' requirement that 
Bel-Ray consent in writing to any assignment of Chemrite's 
interest. As noted, the Trade Agreements are international 
agreements between United States and South African 
parties. To determine the legal effect of this provision, we 
must first resolve the threshold matter of which 
jurisdiction's contract law we should apply. Ordinarily, this 
would require a conflict of laws analysis to determine which 
state had the weightier interest in having its law apply in 
resolving the relevant issue. Because of a failure of proof 
discussed below, however, we will apply the law of the 
forum. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 controls 
determinations of foreign law in federal court. It provides: 
 
       A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the 
       law of a foreign country shall give notice by pleadings 
       or other reasonable written notice. The court, in 
       determining foreign law, may consider any relevant 
       material or source, including testimony, whether or not 
       submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal 
       Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be 
       treated as a ruling on a question of law. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. This rule provides courts with broad 
authority to conduct their own independent research to 
determine foreign law but imposes no duty upon them to do 
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so. See Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 205 
(1st Cir. 1988)("[Rule] 44.1 empowers a federal court to 
determine foreign law on its own, but does not oblige it to 
do so."); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 
150, 155 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) (same). 
 
The parties therefore generally carry both the burden of 
raising the issue that foreign law may apply in an action, 
and the burden of adequately proving foreign law to enable 
the court to apply it in a particular case. See Whirlpool Fin. 
Corp. v. Sevaux, 96 F.3d 216, 221 (7th Cir. 1996)(holding 
that party waived conflicts of law issue because it failed to 
fulfill its obligation under Rule 44.1 "to provide the district 
court with "reasonable notice" of his intention to raise an 
issue of foreign law."); Restatement (Second) Conflict of 
Laws S 136 cmt. f (1971) ("[T]he party who claims that the 
foreign law is different from the local law of the forum has 
the burden of establishing the content of the foreign law."). 
Where parties fail to satisfy either burden the court will 
ordinarily apply the forum's law. See Walter v. Netherlands 
Mead N.V., 514 F.2d 1130, 1137 n.14 (3d Cir. 1975); see 
also Banco de Credito Indus. v. Tesoreria General, 990 F.2d 
827, 837 (5th Cir. 1993)("When the parties have failed to 
conclusively establish foreign law, a court is entitled to look 
to its own forum's law in order to fill any gaps."); Carey, 
864 F.2d at 205 (applying forum's law where parties fail to 
raise issue of foreign law's applicability); Commercial Ins. 
Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 
948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977)(applying forum law where parties 
failed to raise issue of foreign law's applicability); 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws S 136 cmt. h (1971) 
("[W]here either no information, or else insufficient 
information, has been obtained about the foreign law, the 
forum will usually decide the case in accordance with its 
own law, except when to do so would not meet the needs of 
the case or would not be in the interests of justice."). 
 
Lubritene claims that it cannot be bound by Chemrite's 
agreement to arbitrate because, as a matter of contract law, 
the written consent provision prevents it from becoming 
Chemrite's assignee. Lubritene, however, has not raised the 
issue of whether South African contract law applies to its 
claim, nor has it provided any evidence to prove the 
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substance of that law.2 We therefore will apply the law of 
the forum. 
 
This case was brought in New Jersey. Thus, we now turn 
to consider that state's contract law. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the effect of 
contractual provisions limiting or prohibiting assignments. 
Nevertheless, we are not without guidance because the 
Superior Court's Appellate Division recently addressed this 
issue in Garden State Buildings L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, 
N.A., 702 A.2d 1315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
There, a partnership had entered a loan agreement with 
Midatlantic Bank for the construction of a new hotel. The 
parties subsequently entered into a modification agreement 
to extend the loan's maturity date, which provided that: "No 
party hereto shall assign this Letter Agreement (or assign 
any right or delegate any obligation contained herein) 
without the prior written consent of the other party hereto 
and any such assignment shall be void." Id. at 1318. 
Midatlantic subsequently assigned the loan to Starwood 
without obtaining the partnership's prior written consent. 
The partnership acknowledged Starwood's rights under the 
loan agreement by making payments to, and eventually 
entering a settlement agreement with, Starwood. 
Nonetheless, the partnership filed suit against Midatlantic 
for damages arising from its breach of the modification 
agreement's assignment clause. It argued that it was not 
required to void the assignment, but could recognize its 
validity while still preserving its right to sue Midatlantic for 
breach of its covenant not to assign without the 
partnership's written consent. 
 
To resolve this claim the Appellate Division looked to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The only information regarding South African law that Lubritene has 
provided relates to the distinct issue of successor liability. This 
information relates to Lubritene's claim that, if the District Court 
properly considered successor liability, it should have used South 
African, not New Jersey, law on the issue. Lubritene's primary argument, 
however, is that the District Court need not consider successor liability 
principles because this case can be resolved as a matter of contract law. 
In the course of making this argument, Lubritene does not raise the 
issue of which country's contract law applies. 
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S 322 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       (2) A contract term prohibiting assignment of rights 
       under the contract, unless a different intention is 
       manifested . . . . 
 
        (b) gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of 
       the terms forbidding assignment but does not render 
       the assignment ineffective . . . 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 322 (1981) (emphasis 
added). The Court, distinguished between an assignment 
provision's effect upon a party's "power" to assign, as 
opposed to its "right" to assign. A party's "power" to assign 
is only limited where the parties clearly manifest a different 
intention. According to the Court: 
 
       `[t]o reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power 
       to assign, or cause an assignment violative of 
       contractual provisions to be wholly void, such clause 
       must contain express provisions that any assignment 
       shall be void or invalid if not made in a certain 
       specified way.' Otherwise, the assignment is effective, 
       and the obligor has the right to damages. 
 
Garden State, 702 A.2d at 1321 (quoting University Mews 
Assoc's v. Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1984)). The Court concluded that the parties had 
sufficiently manifested their intent to limit Midatlantic's 
power to assign the loan because the anti-assignment 
clause clearly provided that assignments without the other 
party's written consent "shall be void." Id. at 1322. 
 
In adopting S 322, New Jersey joins numerous other 
jurisdictions that follow the general rule that contractual 
provisions limiting or prohibiting assignments operate only 
to limit a parties' right to assign the contract, but not their 
power to do so, unless the parties' manifest an intent to the 
contrary with specificity. See Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd. 
v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 & n.4 (8th Cir. 
1982); Pro Cardiago Pronto Socorro Cardiological, S.A. v. 
Trussell, 863 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Lomas 
Mortgage U.S.A., Inc. v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 812 F. 
Supp. 841, 843-44 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Allhusen v. Caristo 
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Const. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1952); Macklowe v. 
42nd St. Dev. Corp., 566 N.Y.S.2d 606, 606-07 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991); Sullivan v. International Fidelity Ins. 
Co., 465 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1983); 
University Mews Assoc's v. Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d 457, 
461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). To meet this standard the 
assignment provision must generally state that non- 
conforming assignments (i) shall be "void" or "invalid," or (ii) 
that the assignee shall acquire no rights or the non- 
assigning party shall not recognize any such assignment. 
See Garden State, 702 A.2d at 1321 ("clause must contain 
express provisions that any assignment shall be void or 
invalid if not made in a certain specified way"); Cedar Point, 
693 F.2d at 754 n.4 (same); Allhusen, 103 N.E.2d at 893; 
Sullivan, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 238; University Mews, 471 
N.Y.S.2d at 461. In the absence of such language, the 
provision limiting or prohibiting assignments will be 
interpreted merely as a covenant not to assign, or to follow 
specific procedures--typically obtaining the non-assigning 
party's prior written consent--before assigning. Breach of 
such a covenant may render the assigning party liable in 
damages to the non-assigning party. The assignment, 
however, remains valid and enforceable against both the 
assignor and the assignee. See Garden State, 702 A.2d at 
1321; Cedar Point, 693 F.2d at 754 n.4; Pro Cadiago, 863 
F. Supp. at 137; Lomas, 812 F. Supp. at 844; Allhusen, 103 
N.E.2d at 892; Sullivan, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 237. 
 
The Trade Agreements in this case contain the following 
assignment provisions: (i) the Distributor Sales Agreement 
S 7.06 provides that the "Agreement and the obligations and 
rights under this Agreement will not be assignable by 
[Chemrite] without express prior written consent of Bel-Ray, 
which may be withheld at the sole discretion of Bel-Ray"; 
(ii) the Blending and Manufacturing License Agreement 
S 7.05 provides that the "Agreement and the obligations and 
rights hereunder will not be assignable by [Chemrite] 
without the express prior written consent of BEL-RAY"; and 
(iii) the License Agreement to Trade Name S 6.06 provides 
that the "Agreement, and the obligations and rights under 
this agreement will not be assignable without the express 
written consent of all Parties to this Agreement." (A39, A61, 
A83). None contain terms specifically stating that an 
 
                                11 
  
assignment without Bel-Ray's written consent would be 
void or invalid. Several courts have considered virtually 
identical clauses and concluded that they did not contain 
the necessary express language to limit the assigning 
party's power to assign. See Lomas, 812 F. Supp. at 844; 
Macklowe, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 606-07; Sullivan, 465 N.Y.S.2d 
at 236-38. 
 
The Trade Agreements' assignment clauses do not 
contain the requisite clear language to limit Chemrite's 
"power" to assign the Trade Agreements. Chemrite's 
assignment to Lubritene is therefore enforceable, and 
Lubritene is bound to arbitrate claims "relating to" the 
Trade Agreements pursuant to their arbitration clauses. We 
therefore agree with the District Court that Bel-Ray was 
entitled to an order compelling Lubritene to arbitrate. 
 
IV. 
 
We now turn to consider whether the District Court 
properly compelled the Individual Appellants to arbitrate. 
The Individual Appellants contend that the District Court 
erred because it lacked personal jurisdiction over them, and 
because they did not individually agree to arbitrate claims 
with Bel-Ray. We examine these claims in turn. 
 
A. 
 
The Individual Appellants first argue that the District 
Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Bel-Ray 
rejoins that appellants waived personal jurisdiction by 
seeking summary judgment on their counterclaim for 
affirmative injunctive relief against Bel-Ray. We agree. 
 
"Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other 
such rights, be waived." Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd., et al. v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 
(1982). Moreover, the "actions of the defendant may 
amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the 
court, whether voluntary or not." Id. at 704-705. In 
particular, where a party seeks affirmative relief from a 
court, it normally submits itself to the jurisdiction of the 
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court with respect to the adjudication of claims arising from 
the same subject matter. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 
(1938). 
 
Because there "exists a strong policy to conserve judicial 
time and resources," we have held that "preliminary 
matters such as . . . personal jurisdiction . . . should be 
raised and disposed of before the court considers the merits 
or quasi-merits of a controversy." Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. 
Pelmore Lab., Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967). 
Accordingly, in Wyrough we held that a defendant who 
participates in the adjudication of the plaintiff's application 
for a preliminary injunction without securing a 
determination of his challenge to the court's personal 
jurisdiction over him submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
the court unless it is not reasonably feasible tofirst secure 
that determination. See id. This is true even where the 
defendant raises his personal jurisdiction defense at the 
earliest point required by the Federal Rules. See id. 
 
While the Individual Appellants timely raised their 
personal jurisdiction defense in their answer as required by 
the Federal Rules, they did far more than resist an 
application for a preliminary injunction. They asked the 
District Court for affirmative relief before securing a 
determination on their personal jurisdiction defenses. On 
May 21, 1998, three months after they had entered their 
appearances before the District Court, the Individual 
Appellants filed motions for summary judgment on their 
counterclaim asking the Court to enjoin Bel-Ray from 
seeking arbitration. They thereafter proceeded to litigate 
those motions before securing a personal jurisdiction 
determination. Their affidavits supporting their personal 
jurisdiction defenses were not filed until a little over a 
month after their motion for summary judgment was 
denied. Because the record contains nothing suggesting 
that it would be unfair to conclude that the Individual 
Appellants thereby submitted themselves to the District 
Court's jurisdiction, we so hold. 
 
B. 
 
Arbitration is strictly a matter of contract. If a party has 
not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no authority to 
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mandate that he do so. United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). 
The Individual Appellants claim that the District Court 
violated this fundamental principle because they have not 
signed an agreement consenting to submit disputes 
between themselves and Bel-Ray to arbitration. When 
asked to enforce an arbitration agreement against a non- 
signatory, we ask whether he or she is bound by that 
agreement under traditional principles of contract and 
agency law. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 
1503 (3d Cir. 1994); Pritzker v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, 7 F.3d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Bel-Ray insists that the Individual Appellants are bound 
by the arbitration clauses in the Trade Agreements"based 
on their status as [Lubritene's] agents," citing our decision 
in Pritzker. Appellants' Br. at 16. Bel-Ray does not 
explicate, however, what principle of agency law enabled 
Lubritene to contract away the Individual Appellants' right 
to litigate their personal liability on claims brought against 
them. Our reading of Pritzker does not suggest such a 
principle, and our research has uncovered none. 
 
In Pritzker, the trustees of a pension plan sued the 
brokerage firm which traded on behalf of the plan, the 
broker in the firm that serviced the plan's account, and a 
sister corporation of the brokerage firm that provided the 
plan with investment advice. The arbitration clause that the 
trustees sought to enforce was set forth in the Cash 
Management Agreement between the trustees and the 
brokerage firm; neither the broker nor the sister 
corporation signed the agreement. After a dispute arose 
regarding investment decisions and the trusteesfiled suit, 
the defendants sought to compel arbitration. The trustees 
resisted arbitration and argued that they could not be 
compelled to arbitrate against the broker and the sister 
corporation because they had not entered into an 
arbitration agreement with those parties. We rejected this 
argument. 
 
In Pritzker, the issue was whether a signatory to an 
arbitration agreement could be compelled to arbitrate 
claims it had against the agents of the other party to the 
agreement. As we made clear at the outset of the opinion, 
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the result turned on a construction of the arbitration clause 
to which the trustees had agreed -- i.e., whether it was 
broad enough in scope to encompass claims against agents 
of the brokerage firm arising out of the relationship 
between the brokerage firm and the trustees. We held that 
by agreeing in the context of the customer's agreement to 
arbitrate "all controversies which may arise between us," 
the trustees had committed themselves to arbitrate claims 
against the firm and its agents arising out of the brokerage 
relationship. We noted that since the brokerage could act 
only through agents and employees, "an arbitration 
agreement would be of little value if it did not extend to 
[them]." Id. at 1122 (quoting Troll v. Paciolla, 748 F. Supp. 
305, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1990). Accordingly, "[i]n keeping with 
the federal policy favoring arbitration," we "extend[ed] the 
scope of the arbitration clauses to agents of the party who 
signed the agreements." Id. at 1122. 
 
The issue before us, however, is not the construction of 
the arbitration clauses. The relevant issue here is whether 
an employee or agent who did not agree to arbitrate can be 
compelled to arbitrate his personal liability on the basis of 
a commitment made by the corporation he serves. 
 
The only other cases relied upon by Bel-Ray are our 
decision in Isidor Paiewonsky Assoc., Inc. v. Sharp 
Properties Inc., 998 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1993), and the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Letizia v. Prudential Bache Securities, 802 F.2d 1185 (9th 
Cir. 1986). Like Pritzker, Letizia was a suit by a client 
against a brokerage firm and the two firm employees who 
handled the account. As in Pritzker, the employees sought 
to compel the client to arbitrate his claims against them 
and the result turned on construction of the arbitration 
clause in the agreement between the client and thefirm. 
The court concluded that "all of the individual defendants' 
allegedly wrongful acts related to their handling of[the 
client's] securities account" and that the firm had "clearly 
indicated its intentions [in the agreement] to protect its 
employees" from the expense of litigation arising from their 
work activities. Id. at 1188. Accordingly, the client's claims 
against the employees were held to be within the scope of 
the client's commitment to arbitrate, and the employees 
were held to be entitled to enforce that commitment. 
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In the Sharp case, a landlord and "head tenant" of a 
shopping center had entered a master lease containing an 
arbitration clause. The issue we were required to decide 
was whether a subtenant, who had not signed the master 
lease, was bound by an award resulting from arbitration 
between the landlord and the "head tenant." The award 
authorized the landlord to regain possession of the portion 
of the leasehold occupied by the subtenant. We held that 
the subtenant was bound, despite the fact that it was not 
a party to the arbitration agreement. We first looked to 
"basic principles of landlord-tenant law": 
 
       As a general matter, it is well-established that a 
       subtenant's interest in real property cannot exceed that 
       of the head tenant because the subtenant's interest in 
       the real property is strictly derivative of that of the 
       head tenant. Normally, then, if a head tenant loses its 
       rights to continued possession of the property in 
       question, so does the subtenant . . . 
 
       Thus, to the extent that common law principles of the 
       rights of subtenants inform our analysis here, [the 
       subtenant] cannot complain when its rights to 
       continued possession of the Bolero Building ended 
       upon an adverse adjudication of the rights of its 
       sublessor, [the head tenant]. 
 
Sharp, 998 F.2d at 154. 
 
We then turned to the FAA and determined that none of 
its provisions required a different result. Accordingly, we 
enforced the award against the subtenant. While the 
general approach we followed in Sharp is equally applicable 
here, the ruling there provides little help in resolving this 
case. 
 
We thus conclude that Bel-Ray has tendered no 
authorities supporting its position. Nor has our own 
research revealed supporting authority. On the contrary, 
the authority that does exist suggests to us that the District 
Court erred in compelling the Individual Appellees to 
arbitrate. 
 
Generally, of course, an agent of a disclosed principal, 
even one who negotiates and signs a contract for her 
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principal, does not become a party to the contract. Kaplan 
v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 
1994); Restatement (Second) of Agency S 320 (1958). 
Moreover, under traditional agency principles, the only 
other way we understand that an agent can be bound by 
the terms of a contract is if she is made a party to the 
contract by her principal acting on her behalf with actual, 
implied, or apparent authority. The record in this case will 
not support a decision for Bel-Ray on any of these theories. 
 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 
773 (2d Cir. 1995), catalogues the various theories 
recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
for binding non-signatories to an arbitration clause. After 
noting that each theory is based on "common law principles 
of contract and agency law," the court set forth the 
following list: 
 
       1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 
       3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5)  estoppel. 
 
Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776. 
 
In Thomson, the District Court compelled a non-signatory 
parent corporation to arbitrate based on an arbitration 
agreement between its subsidiary and one of the 
subsidiary's suppliers. The Court of Appeals reversed. After 
analyzing the record before it under each of the enumerated 
theories, the Court held that the District Court lacked 
authority under common law contract and agency 
principles to compel the parent to arbitrate even though the 
claim against it arose out of the relationship between the 
subsidiary and the supplier. 
 
Having similarly compared our record with the Thomson 
court's explanation of each of the five enumerated theories, 
we have also concluded that each is inapposite here. As in 
Thomson, the record will not support a piercing of the 
corporate veil and, without disregarding the entity of 
Lubritene, it is not possible to find the direct benefit 
required by the estoppel cases. 
 
Here, as in Kaplan, traditional principles of contract and 
agency law do not support the conclusion that the parties 
resisting arbitration are bound by an arbitration agreement 
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they did not sign. Accordingly, we hold that the District 
Court erred in compelling the Individual Appellants to 
arbitrate Bel-Ray's claims against them. Bel-Ray may, if it 
so chooses, apply to the District Court for a stay of the 
proceeding on those claims pending its arbitration with 
Lubritene. 
 
V. 
 
The order of the District Court compelling arbitration will 
be reversed and the case will be remanded to it with 
instructions to enter an order compelling only Lubritene to 
arbitrate. 
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